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SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES

THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE NAFTA
INSOLVENCY PROJECT
Jay Lawrence Westbrook & Jacob S. Ziegel
I. INTRODUCTION

As the North American continent continues to expand its
free trade policies, the need for compatible approaches to insolvency proceedings has come to the forefront. The American
Law Institute (ALI) Transnational Insolvency' Project (the
Project) is one important part of the process of integrating the
economies of the three countries signatory to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).2 It is intended to produce a framework for close cooperation, and some integration,
in the management of insolvencies having effects in more than
one of the NAFTA countries. The attention given the problem
of bankruptcy in the privatizing economies of Eastern Europe
illustrates the necessity of creating structures for management
of insolvencies as part of any free-market economy. The experiences of the United States, which took 100 years to satisfy the
constitutional mandate of a national bankruptcy law, and of

* Jay Lawrence Westbrook is the Benno C. Schmidt Chair of Business Law
at the University of Texas School of Law. Jacob S. Ziegel is Professor Emeritus in
the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. Westbrook is profoundly grateful to
have at last a co-author whose name is later in the alphabet.
1. We use the term "insolvency" broadly to mean a condition of financial
difficulty, rather than in the traditional, technical sense of "balance-sheet" or "unable-to-pay" insolvency. This broader use is increasingly common internationally, as
reorganization receives greater attention in the field. It should be noted that the
United States Bankruptcy Code does not require a showing of insolvency for a
voluntary bankruptcy, and permits a showing of divestment by a custodian as an
alternative to unable-to-pay insolvency, even in involuntary cases. 11 U.S.C.
§§ 301, 303(h) (1994).
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, done Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.U.S., 32 I.L.M. 296.

BROOK. J. INTL L.

[Vol. XXII

the European Union (EU), which has taken 25 years to propose
a first step toward cooperation in insolvency matters, illustrate
the difficulty of such a task.
The paradigm case for the Project is the bankruptcy of a
company with headquarters in one of the NAFTA countries
and with suppliers, lenders, operations, assets, employees, and
stockholders in all three. That is the sort of financial, operational, and marketing integration to which the NAFTA aspires,
but under present procedures such an insolvency may create a
confusion of conflicting laws, parallel litigation, and overlapping jurisdictional claims. The result might be to make reorganization impossible and liquidation even more disappointing
than is generally true. The ALI's objective is to promote improved harmonization in the treatment of international insolvencies among the NAFTA countries and to create procedures
for coordinating administrations and achieving agreement on
various legal issues.
The Project begins with three self-imposed constraints. It
intends to treat primarily, if not exclusively, the insolvency of
corporations and other business enterprises engaged in commercial operations, rather than individuals. The reason is that
the task is sufficiently difficult if limited to a commercial context, where nothing more than money and jobs are at stake,
rather than more fundamental questions about personal exemptions, discharge, domestic relations, and custody of children. Second, the Project excludes the insolvencies of nonprofit
organizations and financial institutions.3 Again, the reason is
to avoid the substantial additional issues raised by the continued operation of charitable groups and of highly regulated
financial industries.4 The third constraint is that the Project

3. There are certain sectors that have not been excluded, but may not be
specifically addressed, including the securities industry and railways.
4. We do appreciate that the administration of insolvent financial institutions, operating internationally, teaches important lessons equally relevant for the
handling of other business insolvencies. For example, in the liquidation of Bank of
Credit and Commercial International (BCCI), much delay was caused through the
failure of the British and Luxembourg courts to agree on a protocol for the joint
administration of the BCCI estate similar to the protocol adopted in the Maxwell
Communications plc liquidation. Additional problems arose-again paralleling familiar scenarios in internationial insolvencies not involving financial institutions-because a substantial number of countries, including the United States,
insisted on giving priority to local claims against local assets despite the fact that
the funds of the BCCI conglomerate were hopelessly commingled. See Hal S. Scott,

1997]

NAFTA INSOLVENCY PROJECT

will focus on measures that can be adopted without extensive
legislation or formal treaty arrangements, although it is hoped
that experience with the texts that the Project generates may
ultimately serve as the basis for governmental action.
There are two phases to the Project. The first step has
been to develop summary statements of the insolvency laws of
each of the three countries, statements specially tailored to an
international audience. Advisory committees have been formed
in each country and reporters appointed.5 The reporters have
produced draft statements of their domestic laws.' Those
Multinational Bank Insolvencies: The United States and BCCI, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 733,
739-42 (Jacob S. Ziegel ed., 1994).
5. UNITED STATES-Reporter. Jay L. Westbrook, The University of Texas
School of Law, Austin, Texas. Consultant: Rafael A. Porrata-Doria, Jr., Temple
University School of Law, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Advisers: John A. Barrett,
Houston, Texas; Douglass G. Boshkoff, Indiana University School of LawBloomington, Bloomington, Indiana; Sidney B. Brooks, United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Colorado, Denver, Colorado; Richard F. Broude, New
York, New York, Leif M. Clark, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western
District of Texas, San Antonio, Texas; Ronald DeKoven, New York, New York;
Carl Felsenfeld, Fordham University School of Law, New York, New York; James
L. Garrity, Jr., United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York, New York, New York; Richard A. Gitlin, Hartford, Connecticut; Daniel M.
Glosband, Boston, Massachusetts; Maijorie E. Gross, New York, New York; Dianna
P. Kempe, Hamilton, Bermuda; Carolyn Dineen King, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Houston, Texas; Kenneth N. Klee, Los Angeles, California; Lynn M. LoPucki, Washington University School of Law, St. Louis, Missouri;
Ralph R. Mabey, Salt Lake City, Utah; Timothy E. Powers, Dallas, Texas; Harry
C. Sigman, Los Angeles, California; Gerald K. Smith, Phoenix, Arizona; Deborah F.
Stiles, New York, New York; Elizabeth Warren, Harvard University Law School,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
CANADA-Advisory Group Coordinator and Co-reporter: E. Bruce Leonard,
Toronto, Ontario. Co-reporter. Jacob S. Ziegel, University of Toronto, Faculty of
Law, Toronto, Ontario. Consultant: Richard H. McLaren, University of Western
Ontario, Faculty of Law, London, Ontario. Advisers: David E. Baird, Toronto, Ontario; Albert Boh~mier, Facult6 de Droit, Universit6 de Montrdal, Montreal,
Qu6bec; Michael A. Fitch, Vancouver, British Columbia; Jean-Yves Fortin,
Montreal, Quebec; Yoine Goldstein, Montreal, Quebec; J.D. Honsberger, Toronto,
Ontario; Douglas I. Knowles, Vancouver, British Columbia; R. Gordon Marantz,
Toronto, Ontario.
MEXICO-Chair and Co-reporter. Miguel Angel Hernandez Romo, Mexico,
D.F., Mexico. Co-reporter: Carlos Sanchez-Mejorada y Valesco, Mexico, D.F., Mexico. Advisers: Roberto Martfnez Guerrero, Mexico, D.F., Mexico; Dario U. Osc6s
Coria, Mexico, D.F., Mexico; Hector Rojas, Mexico, D.F., Mexico; Alejandro Sayago
Becerril, Mexico, D.F., Mexico; Jose Luis Siqueiros, Mexico, D.F., Mexico. See
AiERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, THE AiERICAN LAW INSTITUTE ANNUAL REPORTS: SEVENTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING, MAY 14-17, 1996, at 130-33 (1996).
6. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT: IN-
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statements are being revised and approved by the distinguished experts on each advisory committee and then subjected to close questioning by the reporters and members of the
advisory committees from each of the other countries. The
result intended is not merely an accurate statement of the
laws and procedures in each country, but one that truly speaks
to the judges, academics, and practitioners in each of the other
two countries. The reporters have described both stated doctrine and common practice, so that the statements reflect the
actual functioning of these insolvency laws in the commercial
societies that they serve. These statements are a crucial preparation for the second phase of the project, but they also will
have considerable stand-alone value, practically and academically.
The second phase of the Project will build on this commonly held body of knowledge to create a series of suggested procedures for insolvency proceedings. For example, it is expected
that the Project will seek to create a system for cross-filing
claims involving a common debtor, as well as a structure for an
international claims facility that will permit creditors, especially small creditors, to file claims in their own languages without
having to retain separate foreign counsel. Another goal is to
obtain agreement on a procedure that might permit automatic
or semi-automatic moratoria (stays) in all three countries when
an insolvency proceeding is filed in any of them. The standing
of insolvency trustees and administratorsin foreign courts and
progress toward common choice-of-law rules on key issues will
no doubt receive careful discussion as well. Although some
clarification and expansion of existing legislation may be required, particularly in Mexico, it is hoped that it will be sufficiently flexible to allow judicial discretion and the forging of
creative solutions. The expectation is that a number of other
agreed procedures can be adopted primarily by judicial action
and by agreement of the parties involved in each case. The fact
that these procedures have been recommended by panels of
TERNATIONAL STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY LAW (Discussion Draft,
Apr. 17, 1996) [hereinafter UNITED STATES DRAFT]; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT OF CANADIAN
BANKRUPTCY LAW (Council Draft No. 1, Nov. 26, 1996) [hereinafter CANADIAN
DRAFT]; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT: INTERNA-

TIONAL STATEMENT OF MEXICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW (Preliminary Draft No. 1, Sept.
11, 1996) [hereinafter MEXICAN DRAFT].
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distinguished experts in each country, under the sponsorship of
the ALI, should make them broadly acceptable in all three
countries.
As of November 1996, drafts have been prepared from all
three jurisdictions and each of the three drafts have received
at least some interrogation from the other two national bodies.
We hope and expect to have approval of the United States and
Canadian drafts by the Spring of 1997. We may have approval
of the Mexican draft by then as well, although prospective
legislative developments-now abated-unavoidably delayed
that draft a bit behind the other two. On that basis, we look
forward to beginning the Phase II discussions in the Spring of
1997. Because Phase II represents a new departure for the
ALI, it will be necessary to invent the structures by which the
committees and reporters will address its issues, as well as to
begin consideration of proposed procedures.

II. THE PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED
At the core of any law-reform project is the identification
of the legal obstacles that must be overcome, so much of the
analysis that follows is devoted to the problems that arise from
the differences in the insolvency systems in the three countries. We must also be mindful, however, of important nonlegal
factors that bear upon the task.
For example, many aspects of the economic integration
,contemplated by the NAFTA are profoundly influenced by the
differences in the size and stages of economic development of
the three countries. To start with, the Gross Domestic Products
(or equivalent) of the three countries in 1994 were US$6.94
trillion for the United States, US$729 billion for Mexico, and
US$640 billion for Canada.' Differences of that magnitude
obviously create significant differences in economic, legal, and
financial perspectives. On the other hand, the economies of the
three countries were closely lashed together even before the
NAFTA was approved.

7. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1997, at 134 (1996).
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A. Differences in Structure and Culture
Even when we turn to legal matters, the differences are
not limited to differences in legal doctrine. The three countries
have substantially different legal structures and contrasting
legal cultures. Most obviously, Mexico has a civil law system
while Canada and the United States are predominantly common-law jurisdictions, although each of them also has a member state with a civil-law tradition.8 On the other hand, the
United States and Mexico are probably closer to each other in
regarding debtors as the primary beneficiaries of insolvency
law, while Canada has a greater regard for the interests of
creditors. With regard to creditors secured by personal property, however, there is a more even distribution of concern, with
Mexico the least friendly and Canada the most friendly. The
United States is between the two on the spectrum of concern
for secured creditors, but closer to Canada. The United States
and Canada have very modern systems of consensual secured
credit, based for the most part on article nine of the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.),9 while Mexico has a rather oldfashioned, possession-oriented system for personal property
security interests.
There is also the obvious contrast between civil and common law systems, although the difference between them is not
simply a matter of the role of precedent. For one thing, Mexico
has a system of jurisprudentiathat contemplates the creation
of binding caselaw rules under certain circumstances. More
profound than the different roles of precedent may be the differing role and career path of a typical judge. In Mexico, as in
many civil-law jurisdictions, judges are civil servants for whom
judging is a lifetime career." By contrast, most judges in Can-

8. The civil law tradition is particularly important in Canada, where for two
centuries this tradition has been an integral part of Qu6bec's struggle to retain its
distinctive linguistic and cultural personality. It has also strongly influenced federal legislative policies, though less so in the insolvency area because pre-confederation Qu6bec did not have an autonomous civilian insolvency law of its own.
9. U.C.C. §§ 9-101 to 9-507 (1994). For the Canadian aspects, see Jacob S.
Ziegel, The New Provincial Chattel Security Regimes, 70 CAN. BAR REV. 681
(1991); cf. Martin Boodman & Roderick Macdonald, How Far is Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code Exportable? A Return to Sources?, 27 CAN. BUS. L.J.
249 (1996) (discussing Qubec's reaction to article 9).
10. See MEXICAN DRAFT, supra note 6, at 6.
11. See id. at 5.
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ada and the United States have been active lawyers for many
years before appointment or election to the bench." In the
common-law jurisdictions, there is considerably more willingness to give judges broad discretion to act as circumstances
warrant in a particular case, while civil lawmakers often feel a
need to prescribe rules to govern judicial action. In part, this
difference reflects the broader experience and greater prestige
of judges in the common-law jurisdictions, and a consequent
willingness to entrust them with broader discretionary pow3
ers.'
The judicial structures in each jurisdiction, and their interaction with the political cultures, are also very different. Mexico is a federation of states, but highly centralized.' 4 Canada's
provinces have considerable autonomy and federal law is primarily enforced through provincial courts,15 but the judges of
the superior courts in the provinces are appointed by the federal government. 6 Additionally, the Supreme Court of Canada
is the final court of appeal from all superior courts on questions of provincial as well as federal law,'1 thus giving Canadian common law a strong doctrinal unity. The United States
is again in between, with a strong system of state law and
judges, but a completely separate federal court system.
In insolvency matters, all three jurisdictions have the
same basic statutory structure, with state or provincial laws

12. The judiciary in both common-law countries also includes a substantial
infusion of former academics and lawyers in government service, but many of
these lawyers have also had a broader experience outside the judiciary and its
administration.
13. We recognize this may be an overgeneralization since some civil-law jurisdictions (such as France and Germany) also endow their judges with wide discretionary powers throtzgh the invocation of open-ended concepts of good faith,
abuse of rights, and unconscionability. Nevertheless, we believe the textual comparison is valid so far as the role of judges in insolvency matters in the NAFTA
jurisdictions is concerned.
14. See MEXICAN DRAFT, supra note 6, at 2.
15. See CANADIAN DRAFT, supra note 6, at 5. Some parts of federal law, but
not insolvency law, are administered in the Federal Court of Canada, which has
both concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction in public and private law areas subject
to federal regulation.
16. See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3, § 96 (U.K.) (formerly
British North America Act, 1867), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5, § 96
(Can.).
17. See id. § 101, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5, § 101 (Can.); Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. S-26, §§ 35-43 (Can.).
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governing most questions of contract and property, but with a
federal insolvency law. However, in Mexico it is usually the
state courts that actually exercise the joint jurisdiction over
insolvency cases that its law gives to state and federal
courts. 8 In Canada, the superior provincial courts exercise
insolvency jurisdiction, 19 and in the United States, the federal
courts have insolvency jurisdiction exclusive of the state courts,
although state court actions often play a role in the insolvency
process.2 0
The three countries also differ in the degree of specialized
administration of insolvency, with Mexico the least specialized
and the United States the most. In Mexico, there are specialized bankruptcy courts only in Mexico City.2 ' In Canada there
are no bankruptcy courts as such, but in Toronto, Canada's
largest city, there is a "commercial list" of judges who handle
most bankruptcy matters.' The United States has an extensive network of specialized bankruptcy courts throughout the
country as part of its federal court system.' Given that bankruptcy in every country is a highly technical subject, these
varying degrees of specialization invariably have an effect on
the elaboration of insolvency laws.
There are a host of other ways in which differing legal
cultures are found in each of the NAFTA countries. A striking
example is the role of formalism in Mexican procedure. Mexican law places great emphasis on the completion of formal
legal steps in the proper way,. and a party can suffer a severe
loss of substantive rights because of a failure to conform to the
formal requirements of the law.' Points of procedure that a
U.S. or Canadian lawyer might brush aside as immaterial can
assume great importance in a Mexican proceeding. Another
example is the emphasis in the United States on successful
reorganization, an emphasis that is found nowhere in the stat18. See MEXICAN DRAFT, supra note 6, at 10.
19. See Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. B-3, § 183(1), amended by S.C. 1992, ch. 27 (Can.). The reasons for Canada's integrated court structure
are historical and derive from the fact that all superior court judges appointed
under the royal prerogative are part of the royal system of justice, exercising
plenary powers unless otherwise provided.
20. See UNITED STATES DRAFT, supra note 6, at 14.
21. See MEXICAN DRAFT, supra note 6, at 11.
22.. See CANADIAN DRAFT, supra note 6, at 91, 92 n.148.

23. See UNITED STATES DRAFT, supra note 6, at 14-15.
24. See MEXICAN DRAFT, supra note 6, at 21.
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ute but clearly animates both Congress and the bankruptcy
judges." It is impossible to understand the actual functioning
of the U.S. bankruptcy system without appreciating that cultural imperative. Another important difference lies in the degree of judicial or governmental involvement in the administration of bankruptcy cases. Here the United States and Mexico have more in common with each other than with Canada in
maintaining a close, step-by-step supervision, whereas in Canada straight commercial liquidations are primarily creditor
driven with minimum judicial involvement (in many cases
none), unless there are complaints about the trustee's conduct
or there are appeals from the trustee's decisions. 6
B. Differences in Substantive Law
Not surprisingly, there are also many differences in substantive law among the three NAFTA countries. Two important instances will illustrate some of the major problems: secured credit and priorities for employee and tax claims.
Although there are many differences of detail, all three
countries provide reasonably effective means of securing consensual debts by mortgages or hipotecas on real (immovable)
property." As noted above, Canada and the United States
have similar statutory systems of secured credit for personal
property. Most of the Canadian provinces" have adopted Personal Property Security Acts (PPSAs) that were derived from
article 9 of the U.C.CY In various respects, the PPSAs are

25. See UNITED STATES DRAFT, supra note 6, at 55-56.

26. There is, however, an important exception under the Canadian Companies'
Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-36, § 11, where the courts exercise

both broad control and close supervision. See CANADIAN DRAFT, supra note 6, at
85-87.
27. See UNITED STATES DRAFT, supra note 6, at 174-76; CANADIAN DRAFT,
supra note 6, at 171-73; MEXICAN DRAFT, supra note 6, at 67-69.
28. Namely, all the common law provinces, with the exception of Prince Ed-

ward Island and Newfoundland.
29. See, e.g., Personal Property Security Act, R.S.N.B. 1993, ch. P-7.1 (amend-

ed 1995) (Can.); Personal Property Security Act, R.S.M. 1987, ch. P35, repealed by
Personal Property Security Act, R.S.M. 1993, ch. 14 (Can.); Personal Property
Security Act, R.S.O. 1990, ch. P.10 (Can.); Personal Property Security Act, R.S.B.C.
1989, ch. 36 (amended 1990) (Can.); Personal Property Security Act, R.S.A. 1988,
ch. P-4.05 (amended 1991) (Can.); Personal Property Security Act, R.S.Y.T. 1986,

ch. 130 (Can.); Personal Property Security Act, S.S. 1993, ch. P-6.2 (Can.). Nova
Scotia's PPSA was enacted in early 1996 but is still awaiting proclamation. Per-

BROOK. J. INTL L.

[Vol. XXIII:1

improved and modernized versions of article 9 and it is likely
(and certainly to be hoped) that the current revision process in
the United States will bring article 9 even closer to the PPSAs
as some of the Canadian innovations are adopted south of the
border."
On the other hand, historical and cultural factors ensure
that .the role of secured credit in these two countries remains
distinctly different. The Canadian tradition is British and, in
addition to such specific security devices as pledge, conditional
sale, chattel mortgage, and the security assignment of receivables, has for more than a century recognized a "floating
charge" covering the entirety of a company's assets and the appointment of a private or court-appointed receiver to take over
the company when it defaults on its secured obligations. Until
recently, a relatively small number of federally incorporated
banks did the bulk of the commercial secured lending in Canada. They were assisted in this activity by long-standing federal
provisions designed to facilitate inventory, agricultural, and
fisheries forms of financing.3 It is only very recent reforms
that have brought all secured creditors under the control of a

sonal Property Security Act, S.N.S. 1995-1996, ch. 13 (Can.). For the pre-1991
history of the article nine-style legislation in Canada, see Ziegel, supra note 9, at
686-99.
The new Qu6bec Civil Code, which came into effect on January 1, 1994,
borrows some features of the common law personal property security legislation in
conferring general recognition on non-possessory security interests in movables, but
the borrowing is incomplete and the new Qu6bec regime is very complex. See
Boodman & Macdonald, supra note 9, at 260-64, for an interesting attempt to
rationalize the Quebec approach.
30. Some of the most important differences between article 9 and the Canadian PPSAs are: (1) all the PPSA provinces have from the beginning adopted a centralized and computerized registry system for all financing statements; (2) many of
the provincial registries permit electronic registrations; (3) particularly in Ontario,
the collateral description requirements are much simpler than in article 9; (4) in
all the acts (with the exception of Ontario's), chattel leases for a year or more are
treated as deemed security interests whether or not a lease meets the normal test
of a security interest; (5) a security interest can be taken in a deposit with a
financial institution and normally will be picked up automatically in a wraparound security interest covering all of a business debtor's assets-the successor to
the pre-PPSA fixed and floating charge of English origin; and (6) all the acts recognize the ability of a receiver appointed by the secured creditor under the security agreement to take possession of the collateral on the debtor's default and to
enforce the security agreement. This last point is another aspect of the British
legacy. For further details concerning most of these differences, see Ziegel, supra
note 9, at 700-03.
31. See Bank Act, S.C. 1991, ch. 46, §§ 427-436 (Can.).
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statutory regime in a reorganization context.32
In the United States, by contrast, creditors secured by
personal property were long regarded with suspicion and have
long been forced to share the suffering of other creditors in
reorganization proceedings." Article 9, now in effect in every
state including Louisiana, a civil-law jurisdiction, imposes a
fairly broad publicity requirement through registration,34 and
the Bankruptcy Code provides substantial incentives for
prompt and accurate registration.35
As noted, Mexico has an old-fashioned system of secured
credit as to personal property. Although there are devices for
obtaining non-possessory security interests,36 the system is
oriented fundamentally to possessory security interests. The
Mexican law provides a system of registration to protect certain security interests against third parties, 7 but the formalities and requirements vary from one category to another. The
National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade in Tucson
is currently working on a project to assist Mexico in adapting
an article 9 system to its needs, but no legislation has yet been
adopted."
Among other consequences, these considerable differences
will make choice-of-law questions relating to security interests
very important in a trans-NAFTA insolvency. For example, it
has been proposed in the United States to change the current
U.C.C. section 9-103 to make the debtor's "location," rather
than the situs of the collateral, the proper place to file a financing statement for virtually all kinds of non-possessory
security interests in collateral, tangible as well as intangible.3 9 Thus all article 9 filings for a company incorporated in
Delaware (under the current draft) would be made in that land

32. See CANADIAN DRAFT, supra note 6, at 6; Jacob S. Ziegel, Canada's
Phased-In Bankruptcy Law Reform, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 383, 390-91 (1996).
33. See UNITED STATES DRAFT, supra note 6, at 60.
34. U.C.C. § 9-302 (1994).
35. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547(b)-(c) (1994).
36. See MEXICAN DRAFr, supra note 6, at 55-81.
37. See id. at 62 n.229, 67-68.
38. The initiative is a project of the National Law Center in Tucson, Arizona,
under the leadership of Professor Boris Kozolchyk. Its principal consultant is a
leading Canadian scholar, Professor R.C.C. Cuming of the University of Saskatchewan.
39. See U.C.C. §§ 9-301, 9-307 (Tentative Draft Feb. 1997); U.C.C. §§ 9-301, 9307 (Tentative Draft Oct. 1996).

BROOK. J, INTL L.

[Vol. XXIII:I

of file drawers, including filings relating to drill presses in a
Vancouver factory and to trade fixtures in a Mexico City outlet
store. The extent to which insolvency proceedings in the three
countries would or would not recognize that choice-of-law rule
would affect profoundly the possibilities of cooperation among
them.
Aside from the place of registration, the conflicts rule for
security interests will determine method of perfection and
scope of security interest. In our example, if certain collateral
physically located in Mexico requires possession for perfection,
but filing is acceptable in Ontario, the same sorts of problems
will arise. And do not even speak to us about a lease that
might be considered a security interest!4"
A second area of difficulty is found in the payment priorities given in each country to employee and tax claims. In Mexico, employee claims trump even secured interests.4 In all
three jurisdictions, employee claims raise serious questions
about nondiscrimination *("national treatment") for priority
claims of all sorts.42 For example, picture a U.S. debtor with
employees in Canada and Mexico, as well as the United States.
Will the Canadian and Mexican employees enjoy the same
priority as the U.S. employees?43 The territorial approach to
transnational bankruptcy has until now obscured this issue,
but it will become increasingly important as cooperation is
achieved in such cases.
The problem is even more serious in the case of tax priorities. In most jurisdictions, the rule has been that foreign tax
claims are not enforceable at all," much less given the same
priority as the local revenuers. If the exemplary U.S. debtor
owed taxes in Ontario, would the Canadian tax authorities
consent to any cooperative arrangement that gave them less
than full priority in the distribution of the proceeds of the
Canadian property? If the Canadian property was insufficient

40. See, e.g., Compliance Marine, Inc. v, Campbell (In re Merritt Dredging
Co.), 839 F.2d 203 (4th Cir. 1988),
41. See MEXICAN DRAFT, supra note 6, at 26-27.

42. See generally Jay L. Westbrook, Universal Participationin Transnational
Bankruptcies, in INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL LAW: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF ROY GOODE (Ross Cranston ed., forthcoming 1997).
43. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3)-(4) (1994).
44. See UNITED STATES DRAFT, supra note 6, at 114. But see QUEBEC CML

CODE art. 3162 (Can.) (recognizing foreign tax claims on a reciprocity basis).
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to pay the tax claims and the Canadian revenue authorities
made a claim in the U.S. proceeding, would the court recognize
the claim at all? What are the chances the U.S. court would
give the Canadian claim the same status as an Internal Revenue Service claim? These are serious questions without clear
answers. Further complications arise where, as is true in Canada, tax legislation creates a deemed trust or imposes a
superpriority lien on the debtor's property for unremitted taxes.45 Would a U.S. court recognize these provisions if some of
the encumbered assets were subsequently removed to the United States?
It is hard to imagine that any scheme of international
cooperation can succeed if it is seriously offensive to labor
unions or the revenue authorities in the cooperating jurisdictions, so these problems will require solution if the Project is to
achieve its goals.
III. BALANCING UNVERSALISM AND TERRITORIALITY

A critical challenge facing the ALI project is how to reconcile the competing values of universalism and territoriality
with respect to the recognition of insolvency proceedings
among the NAFTA partners. The universalist theory, it will be
recalled, argues strongly in favor of recognizing proceedings
initiated in the jurisdiction which has the closest, or at least a
close, connection with the debtor corporation.46 The
territorialist approach, on the other hand, allows each state to
administer the assets in its territory with little regard to what
is happening elsewhere. Few would deny that the universalist
approach is much more equitable, and more compatible with
the NAFTA goals. The ability to apply a single bankruptcy
system, regardless of where the debtor's assets and creditors
are located, is probably indispensable for the successful completion of a business reorganization.47 Nevertheless, as recent

45. See, e.g., Income Tax Act, R&S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), ch. 1, as amended,

§ 224(1)-(2), 227(4)-(5) (Can.); Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. B-3,
§ 67(2)-(3), as amended by S.C. 1992, ch. 27 (Can.); see also Jacob S. Ziegel, Secured Transactions in Personal Property and the Federal-Provincial Conflict in
Canadian Bankruptcy Law, 46 S.C. L. REV. 877, 882-90 (1995).
46. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457, 469-71 (1991).
47. We recognize that there are some recent reorganizations which appear to
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European developments involving the Istanbul Convention4 8
and the draft EU Convention49 show, the territorialist philosophy continues to hold a powerful grip and will not be easy to
loosen in the NAFTA context.
This becomes clear when we consider the current position
of each of the three NAFTA partners. Only the United States,
in section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, explicitly accepts the
principle of universality." Even there, it is hedged about with
so many safeguards in favor of U.S. creditors that it is not
difficult for a skeptical bankruptcy judge to thwart a section
304 petition.5 It is more accurate, therefore, to characterize
section 304, as does the ALI U.S. report, as incorporating only
a modified form of universalism.52
Canadian law, too, as heir to 19th century British precedents, claims to adhere to a modified universalism. However,
the claim must be accepted cautiously, given the remarkably
unsettled state of the Canadian jurisprudence, especially with
respect to the recognition of U.S. reorganization proceedings 3
contradict this claim; for example, the Maxwell Communications plc and the Olympia & York Developments Ltd. reorganizations. However, although both cases were
reorganizations from a procedural perspective, they had the effect of liquidating
the debtor's assets, although the subsidiaries were for the most part sold on a
going-concern basis. The same is true of another still more recent Canadian-U.S.
reorganization involving the company Everfresh Beverages. In re Proposal of
Everfresh Beverages, Inc., No. 32-077978, 1995 Ont. C. J. LEXIS 4572 (Ont. Gen.
Div. Dec. 20, 1995) (endorsement of order) (Farley, J.); In re Everfresh Beverages,
Inc., Ch. 11 Case Nos. 95 B 45405, 95 B 45406 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1995)
(order approving the stipulation regarding cross-border insolvency Protocol).
48. European Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy,
June 5, 1990, arts. 16-28, Europ. T.S. No. 136, at 13-16 (provisions relating to
secondary bankruptcies).
49. European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, Nov. 23, 1995,
arts. 27-38, 35 I.L.M. 1223, 1231-33 (provisions relating to secondary bankruptcies).
See generally Ian F. Fletcher, The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: An Overview and Comment, with U.S. Interest in Mind, 23 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 25 (1997); Manfred Balz, The European Union Convention on Insolvency
Proceedings, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485 (1996).
50. 11 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1994).
51. See, e.g., Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A. v. Refco F/X Assocs. (In re
Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A.), 961 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1992) (use of constructive
trust device to give U.S. asset to U.S. creditor); Interpool, Ltd. v. Certain Freights
of the MV Venture Star, 102 B.R. 373 (D.N.J. 1988) (refusal to defer to Australian bankruptcy because of difference in Australian law); In re Papeleras Reunidas
S.A., 92 B.R. 584 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Toga Mfg., Ltd., 28 B.R. 165
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983). See generally Douglass G. Boshkoff, Some Gloomy
Thoughts Concerning Cross-borderInsolvencies, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 931 (1994).
52. UNITED STATES DRAFT, supra note 6, at 108-09.
53. See CANADIAN DRAFT, supra note 6, at 125-53. With respect to recognition
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and the many exceptions to the principle of recognition.5 4 The
international insolvency provisions in the bankruptcy
amendment bill currently before the Canadian Parliament55
only modestly removes the existing hurdles while leaving others untouched. Part XIII of Bill C-5 clearly gives the foreign
representative status before a Canadian court to seek the
court's assistance-to impose a stay against hostile proceedings
against the debtor and its assets and to collect the assets and
administer the estate, to give the more important examples-and also allows the representative to commence secondary insolvency proceedings in Canada. On the other hand, Part
XIII is pointedly silent in dealing with the representative's
entitlement to remove assets out of Canada, does not prohibit
secondary proceedings in Canada after insolvency proceedings
have begun in the jurisdiction of the debtor's principal place of
jurisdiction, and does not recognize a debtor in possession
under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Code as satisfying the
requirement of a "foreign representative" in Part
definitional
56
XIII.
Of the three NAFTA countries, Mexico still adheres most
closely to the territorialist school, although as non-Mexican
academics we are ill-positioned to express any but the most
circumspect views on the Mexican law. The draft Mexican ALI
report" tells us that the Mexican bankruptcy code only contains two articles dealing with international bankruptcies"
and apparently there is very little, if any, jurisprudence interpreting either of them. It seems clear, however, that a foreign
insolvency is not entitled to recognition per se in Mexico. Like-

of foreign insolvency proceedings in Qu6bec, see id. at 141-44.
54. See id. at 128-37.
55. An Act to Amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Companies'
Creditors Arrangement Act and the Income Tax Act, Bill C-5, 2d Sess., 35th Parl.,
pt. XIII, §§ 268-275 (Mar. 4, 1996) (Can.), reprinted in CANADIAN DRAFT, supra
note 6, at 186-89. Bill C-5 was given final Parliamentary approval on April 15,
1997. See Status of House Business: Government Bills (No. 8) (visited Apr. 29,
1997) <http-J/www.parl.gc.ca/status/statusl-e.html>.
56. See CANADIAN DRAFT, supra note 6, at 150-53; Ziegel, supra note 32, at
410-15.
57. MEXICAN DRAFT, supra note 6, at 43-44.
58. Ley de Quiebras y Suspensi6n de Pagos [Law of Bankruptcy and Suspension of Payments], arts. 13-14, translated in 1 COMMERCIAL & INVESTMENT LAW:
LATIN AMERICA, doc. 7.1, at 7.1-5 (Andrea Bonime-Blanc ed., 1996); see MEXICAN
DRAFT, supra note 6, at 44.
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wise, a liquidation of the Mexican-based assets by the foreign
representative will be governed by the Mexican bankruptcy
code including, we assume, its provisions concerning the ranking of creditors and the distribution of the proceeds.
Can three such seemingly divergent national approaches
be reconciled? We believe they can, although, to be sure, it will
require considerable patience, ingenuity, and a building-block
approach.
Despite the cautiousness of Bill C-5, recent Canadian judgments have shown a strong commitment to international comity"9 and a willingness to cooperate with U.S. bankruptcy
courts where insolvency proceedings are pending in both jurisdictions." We also believe there is a better than even chance
that, given the opportunity, the Supreme Court of Canada will
dismantle some of the most objectionable judicially created
barriers of an earlier age.
Similarly, notwithstanding the temptations to parochialism in section 304, courts in the United States have quite
frequently cooperated with foreign insolvency proceedings. 6

59. See De Savoye v. Morguard Invs. Ltd. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 (Can.); Re
Olympia & York Devs. Ltd. [19961 29 O.R. (3d) 626 (Can.) (Blair, J.); In re Antwerp Bulkcarriers N.V. [1996] I.C.R. 96 (Super. Ct. Bankr., Montreal June 28,
1996) (Can.) (Guthrie, J.); see CANADIAN DRAFT, supra note 6, at 93-94.
60. See CANADIAN DRAFT, supra note 6, at 104 n.194, 107 n.205.
61. See, e.g., In re Maxwell Communications Corp., Ch. 11 Case No. 91 B
15741 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1992) (Brozman, J.) (order appointing examiner);
In re Maxwell Communications Corp., Ch. 11 Case No. 91 B 15741 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1993) (Brozman, J.) (order confirming plan); In re Brierley, 145
B.R. 151, 164 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (decision in related case describing cooperation in Maxwell Communications case); In re Axona Int'l Credit & Commerce Ltd.,
88 B.R. 597 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (avoiding transfers to United States creditors
and returning proceeds to Hong Kong primary proceeding for distribution), aft'd,
115 B.R. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), appeal dismissed, 924 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1991); In re
Ocana, 151 B.R. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1993);'In re Rubin, 160 B.R. 269 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1993); In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear de Mexico S.A., 44 F.3d 187, 193-94 (3d Cir.
1994) (district court must consider staying a suit over Mexican joint venture upon
request of Mexican court where joint venture company's bankruptcy is pending);
Blanco v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela SA4., 997 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1993) (forum
non conveniens deferral to Venezuelan insolvency proceeding, although with certain
conditions); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 174 B.R. 884, 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (enforcing limitation on arbitration and collection rights pursuant to U.K. scheme of
arrangement); Pravin Banker Assocs. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 165 B.R. 379
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (delay of United States suit in deference to Peruvian insolvency
proceeding); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Oy Wartsila A.B., 159 B.R. 984 (S.D.
Fla. 1993) (United States suit against bankrupt Finnish boat company dismissed,
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Reaching consensus with our Mexican friends may prove
more complex and may not be possible without some amendments to the Mexican bankruptcy code. Nevertheless, NAFTA
has created such a powerful impetus, and such favorable trade
winds are blowing across the American continent, north and
south, that we are cautiously optimistic about the outcome
there as well.
IV. ROLE OF JUDGES
It must be emphasized that no reform project in this area
will succeed unless it is accompanied by efforts to help judges
become comfortable with the judges and laws in the other two
jurisdictions. The international statements produced by the
Project should help in that regard, by giving the bench authoritative descriptions of foreign insolvency laws approved by leading experts in the countries concerned and designed to "speak"
to knowledgeable lawyers in the judges' own countries. The
participation of judges in the Project will itself contribute to
their knowledge of foreign law.
Beyond these effects, however, it will be important for
judges to be exposed to these materials in conferences and
symposia and to have an opportunity to meet and talk with
their counterparts in the other NAFTA countries. For several
years, the International Association of Insolvency Practitioners
(INSOL) has conducted transnational judicial colloquia that
bring together interested judges from all over the world.
INSOL's approach can serve as a model for the kind of education and communication process that will be essential to success in the NAFTA project.
forum non conveniens, without a § 304 filing); In re Spanish Cay Co., 161 B.R.
715 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993) (deference to Bahamian bankruptcy proceeding);
Victrix S.S. Co. S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1987);
Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. A.B., 773 F.2d 452, 458 (2d Cir. 1985);
Caddel v. Clairton Corp., 105 B.R. 366 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989); In re Gercke, 122
B.R. 621 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1991). See generally Evan D. Flaschen & Timothy B.
DeSieno, Section 304 and Related Provisions-United States Treatment of Foreign
Insolvencies, 1990 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 369; Evan D. Flaschen, Section 304 and
Related Provisions-United States Treatment of Foreign Insolvencies, 1989 ANN.
SuRv. BANKR. L. 259; Stefan A Riesenfeld, TransnationalBankruptcies in the Late
Eighties: A Tale of Evolution and Atavism, in COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE INTERNA-

TIONAL LAw 409 (David S. Clark ed., 1990); Richard . Gitlin & Evan D.
Flaschen, The International Void in the Law of Multinational Bankruptcies, 42
Bus. LAW. 307 (1987).
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V. CONCLUSION

It seems clear that regional agreements may be the best
first step in solving many of the problems of legal harmonization and cooperation coincident to the globalization of trade
and investment. The NAFTA countries represent one of the
largest trade areas in the world. The ALI initiative is an innovative approach to private-sector law reform that may have an
important impact on the evolution of transnational bankruptcy
law and on the development of international law in many other
fields as well.

